UIC Law Review
Volume 43

Issue 1

Article 6

Fall 2009

Silencing Tory Bowen: The Legal Implications of Word Bans in
Rape Trials, 43 J. Marshall L. Rev. 215 (2009)
Randah Atassi

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, Criminal Law
Commons, Evidence Commons, First Amendment Commons, Judges Commons, Jurisprudence
Commons, Law and Gender Commons, Litigation Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Randah Atassi, Silencing Tory Bowen: The Legal Implications of Word Bans in Rape Trials, 43 J. Marshall
L. Rev. 215 (2009)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol43/iss1/6
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For
more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

SILENCING TORY BOWEN:
THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF WORD
BANS IN RAPE TRIALS
RANDAH ATASSI*
I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine surviving a rape. Imagine that you are courageous
enough to testify and confront your assailant.'
Then imagine
being told by a judge that you can only use clinical terms like "sex"
and "intercourse" to describe your experience, being forced to
describe the attack with words usually reserved for a nonviolent
consensual act. This is exactly what happened to Tory Bowen. 2
Her experience has created a stir in feminist and free speech
circles and caused many to question: what rights do rape victims
have?
In the United States, a woman is sexually assaulted every
two minutes.3 Yet, only 6% of rapists will ever spend time in jail.4
One of the many reasons for this discrepancy is that only 60% of
rapes are reported, making it among the most underreported
* Randah Atassi is a third-year student at The John Marshall Law
School. She currently serves as Student Publications Editor of The John
Marshall Law Review. This Comment would not have been possible without
the inspiration and motivation of Women's and Gender Studies Professor Ann
Russo and Professor Elizabeth Kelly at DePaul University who opened her
eyes to the crisis of violence against women and taught her to always speak
truth to power. Randah would also like to thank the incomparable legal minds
that helped her with this comment: Professor Susan Brody, Professor Timothy
O'Neill, and Professor Corey Yung. Finally, she would like to thank her
friends and family for all their support and understanding during the process
of writing this Comment.
1. See SuSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 15 (Harvard University Press 1987)
(explaining that many rape victims never report being raped).
2. See generally Nicole Wiesensee Egan, She Couldn't Call It 'Rape'
PEOPLE, Oct. 10, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 19702211 (recounting the

rape of Tory Bowen).
3. Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network, How Often Does the Sexual
Assault Occur?, http://www.rainn.org/get-information/statistics/frequency-ofsexual-assault (last visited Apr. 11, 2009) (citing Department of Justice 2006
Crime Victimization Survey).
4. Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network, Reporting Rates,
(last visited
http://www.rainn.org/get-information/statistics/reporting-rates
Apr. 11, 2009) [hereinafter Reporting Rates] (factoring the rate of unreported
rapes/sexual assaults).
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crimes.5 Many have attributed the underreporting of sexual
assault offenses to the treatment rape victims receive from the
criminal justice system.6 Frequently, victims do not come forward
out of fear of being blamed for their attacks, as they often blame
themselves. 7
Rape is treated uniquely in the justice system, unlike any
other field of criminal law; it is the only crime where the victim
can effectively be put on trial.8 Rape's "uniqueness" concept is
magnified in the courtroom, where rape victims come face to face
with their attackers, relive their story, and are subjected to crossexamination 9 No one is more aware of this struggle than Tory
Bowen, who was told not to use the word "rape" to testify about
being raped.1 0
This Comment explores the implications of word bans on
rape trials as well as their impact on rape victims. Part II of this
Comment describes the experience of Tory Bowen. It also looks at
5. Id. See John Dwight Ingram, Date Rape: It's Time for "No" to Really
Mean "No," 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 3, 13 (1993) (asserting that one of the reasons of
the low rate of rape prosecution is the difficulty in successfully prosecuting the
offender and that most rape victims never report their rapes); Morrison
Torrey, When Will We Be Believe? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in
Rape Prosecutions,24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1013, 1028 (1991) (citing the rate of
false reporting to be 2%, making it comparable to the false reporting rates of
other crimes, and explaining that there is no factual data to support the myth
that rape is often falsely reported).
6. See GREGORY M. MATOESIAN, REPRODUCING RAPE: DOMINATION
THROUGH TALK IN THE COURTROOM 14 (The University of Chicago Press 1993)
(arguing that there are those who believe that sexual violence is
institutionalized in this country and legitimized by the U.S. legal system).
7. See id. at 34 (stating that "[r]ape 'is a fear much worse than fear of
other crimes because women know that they are held responsible for avoiding
rape, and should they be victimized they know they are likely to be blamed."'
(quoting MARGARET GORDON AND STEPHANIE RIGER, THE FEMALE FEAR 2

(University of Illinois Press 1989))).
8. See Torrey, supra note 5, at 1058 (claiming that rape is the only crime,
in which the victim is put on trial and the defendant is treated as if a victim).
9. See AMANDA KONRADI, TAKING THE STAND: RAPE SURVIVORS AND THE
PROSECUTION OF RAPISTS 177 (Praeger Publishers 2007) (arguing that the

reason many rape victims do not report their assaults is the fear of being
"reassaulted" by defense attorneys and prosecutors and the small chance of
success at trial).
10. For discussions of Tory Bowen's case, see generally Josh Funk, SexAssault Case Dropped, Judge Banned Words, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 5,
2008, available at 2008 WLNR 277526; Paul Hammel, No New Trial in 'Rape'
Ban Case, OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Jan. 4, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR
210453; Clarence Mabin, Banned Words Spark Debate in Sexual Assault Case,
LINCOLN JOURNAL STAR, June 17, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 11560417
[hereinafter Banned Words]; Clarence Mabin, Judge: Use of Term 'Rape' Could
Unfairly Bias Jury, LINCOLN J. STAR, Oct. 3, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR
19550282 [hereinafter Judge]; Judge Sued After Limiting Language in Trial
"Rape" Was Among Words He Barred, Accuser Says that Violated Her Rights,
SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 9, 2007, availableat 2007 WLNR 17618043.
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the historical treatment of word bans generally as well as more
specifically in regard to the word "rape." This section also explains
the various myths and stereotypes associated with rape and rape
Finally, it examines the legislative remedies
victims.
implemented to deal with these stereotypes.
Part III analyzes the legal impact of word bans on defendants'
and victims' rights. It also shows that these word bans have little
impact on defendants' rights and could not justify the harm to
victims. Part III argues that these word bans are part of an
institutionalized bias in the legal system against rape victims that
stems from, what many legal and feminist scholars have called,
"rape culture.""
Finally, Part IV will propose that these word bans be
prohibited in order to encourage victims to testify and increase the
rates of reporting and conviction for rape and other sex crimes.
Currently, rape shield laws have been enacted in most states and
codified in the Federal Rules of Evidence1 2 in order to protect
13
victims from having their sexual history brought up at trial.
Amending existing rape shield laws and taking measures to
ensure that those laws do more to protect victims' rights can
accomplish the goal of encouraging victims to testify without
infringing on defendants' rights.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Tory Bowen's Story

In October 2004 following a Halloween party, 14 Tory Bowen
left a downtown Lincoln, Nebraska, bar with Pamir Safi-who
later allegedly sexually assaulted her.15 Bowen has no memory of
leaving the bar, 16 and the next thing she remembers is regaining
consciousness with Safi already on top of her. 17

11. See generally ANDREA

DWORKIN ET AL.,

TRANSFORMING A RAPE

CULTURE (Emilie Buchwald, Pamela Fletcher & Martha Roth eds., Milkweed
Editions 2005) (1995) (referring to sexual inequities in rape prosecutions as a
"rape culture").
12. FED. R. EVID. 412. Rule 412 is titled "Sex Offense Cases; Relevance of
Alleged Victim's Past Sexual Behavior or Alleged Sexual Predisposition." Id.
It operates by first generally excluding evidence about a victim's sexual
history. FED. R. EVID. 412(a). Secondly, the following subdivisions provide
exceptions to that general rule. FED. R. EVID. 412(b)-(c).
13. See Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality
License: Sexual Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
51, 56 (2002) (stating that rape shield laws were enacted to protect victims
from being forced to publicly disclose their private sexual history).
14. Hammel, supra note 10.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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Safi was charged with first-degree sexual assault,1 8 and the
case went to trial.1 9 Following a motion by defense counsel, Judge
Jeffrey Cheuvront entered an order to exclude the use of such
words as "rape" and "victim" but allowed Bowen to use words like
"sex" or "intercourse," despite the prosecution's attempt to get
those words banned as well. 20 The judge later modified the ruling
to allow the use of "sexual assault."21 Bowen said being forced to
use the word "sex" to describe her experience was like being
assaulted all over again. 22 The first case ended in a mistrial
because the jury could not reach a unanimous verdict. 23
Following the trial, free speech and feminist activists took up
Bowen's cause. 24 The second trial ended with Judge Cheuvront
declaring a mistrial because protesters had interfered with jury
selection, 25 and the case was not pursued a third time.26 Bowen
18. The statutory definition of first degree sexual assault in Nebraska is:
(1) Any person who subjects another person to sexual penetration (a)
without the consent of the victim, (b) who knew or should have
known that the victim was mentally or physically incapable of
resisting or appraising the nature of his or her conduct, or (c) when
the actor is nineteen years of age or older and the victim is at least
twelve but less than sixteen years of age is guilty of sexual assault in
the first degree.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-319(1) (2007). In Nebraska, "the victim's lack of consent
is not an element of the crime of sexual assault when the victim is incapable of
resisting or appraising the nature of his or her conduct." State v. Rossbach,
650 N.W.2d 242, 250 (2002).
19. See Clarence Mabin, Woman Sues Judge in Sex Assault Case, LINCOLN
JOURNAL STAR, Sept. 8, 2007, availableat 2007 WLNR 17739377 (stating that
Safi was charged with sexual assault and tried by a jury).
20. See Banned Words, supra note 10 (explaining that Judge Cheuvront
denied the state's motion because he felt that if he granted it, there would be
no words left to describe the act).
21. See Hammel, supra note 10 (noting that the judge allowed the "equally
descriptive term" of "sexual assault").
22. Dahlia Lithwick, Gag Order: A Nebraska Judge Bans the Word Rape
from His Courtroom, SLATE, June 20, 2007, at 1, available at
http://www.slate.comlid/2168758/. This article explains that Bowen felt that
being forced to use the word 'sex' to describe her experience was like an
assault in itself. Id. See Paul Hammel, Lawsuit on "Rape" Ban Is Defended,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Sept. 19, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 18323315
(citing Bowen's attorney who argued that forcing Bowen to use 'clinical
language' was confusing and misleading to jurors and impacted Bowen's
credibility); Judge, supra note 10 (quoting Bowen that being forced to use
clinical terms felt unnatural and contrived).
23. See Mabin, supra note 19 (stating that a mistrial was declared in the
first case when jury was deadlocked seven to five).
24. See Kelly Bramlet, Protest Here Decries Judge's Ban on 'Rape,' 'Victim'
in Rape Case, SPRINGFIELD STATE JOURNAL-REGISTER, July 18, 2007,
available at 2007 WLNR 13765698 (describing how Promoting Awareness,
Victim Empowerment ("PAVE"), a Chicago-based nonprofit group, organized
the first set of protests that were held in Nebraska).
25. See Mabin, supra note 19 (stating that Cheuvront declared a mistrial
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filed a lawsuit in federal court, which was dismissed, 27 challenging
Cheuvront's actions on the grounds that they violated her
constitutional rights. 28 She said she would appeal the decision to
the Supreme Court if necessary, 29 and she did just that, but the
Supreme Court denied certiorari. 30
The reasoning behind the judge's decision to allow the word
ban was that the word "rape" in a victim's testimony might be
unfairly prejudicial to the defendant, who is presumed innocent
until proven guilty.3 1 Another justification was that use of the
word "rape" would allow the witness to testify to a legal
conclusion. 32 Judge Cheuvront cited a state law that allowed him
to ban words that might be unfairly prejudicial to the defendant. 33
B. I Can't Say What?
Historically, cases have held that the use of the word "rape" is
permissible.3 4 In State v. Goss, over defense counsel's objection, the
judge allowed the victim to testify that the defendant was "raping"
her, finding that her use of the term rape was her way of
describing her experience in lay terms.3 5 That case reaffirmed the
during jury selection because of intense media coverage and protests).
26. Hammel, supra note 10.
27. See Clarence Mabin, Lawyer to Appeal Dismissal of Bowen Lawsuit,
LINCOLN JOURNAL STAR, Oct. 17, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 20455708
(explaining that U.S. District Judge Richard Kopf dismissed the suit because

of Supreme Court holdings that prohibit federal courts from getting involved
in cases pending in state court).
28. Bowen v. Cheuvront, No. 4:07CV3221, 2007 WL 2668905, at *1 (D. Neb.
Sept. 10, 2007); Margery A. Gibbs, Appeals Court Upholds Court's Word Ban,
USA TODAY, Apr. 3, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.comlnews
/nation/2008-04-03-2867930717_x.htm?loc=interstitialskip.
The case was
dismissed on procedural grounds citing a lack of jurisdiction. Id.
29. Tony Rizzo, In Some Trials, Accusers Must Watch What They Say, FORT
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, June 9, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 10850172.
30. Bowen v. Cheuvront, 129 S. Ct. 460 (2008).
31. See Hammel, supra note 10 (stating that the terms were banned to
protect defendant's right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty).
32. See Banned Words, supra note 10 (citing statement by one of Safi's
attorney's Clarence Mock, who said that the ruling was to keep the trial fair
and to prevent a witness from reaching a legal conclusion). The Federal Rules
of Evidence, however, provide that: (a) Except as provided in subdivision (b),
testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier
of fact. FED. R. EVID. 704.
33. Hammel, supra note 10. The Nebraska statute states, "Although
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-403
(2007).
34. See cases cited infra notes 35-37.
35. 235 S.E.2d 844, 849 (N.C. 1977). The Supreme Court of North Carolina
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prior ruling of the Supreme Court of North Carolina in State v.
Vinson, holding that a police officer testifying to the victim's use of
the word "rape" during his investigation was not an opinion on a
question of law. 36 In State v. Sneedon, a judge held that a woman
saying she was "raped" was admissible and found it was not a
conclusion on a matter of law. 37 All of these cases from North
Carolina stand for the proposition that a witness may describe her
experience of being "raped" without permitting the victim to come
to a legal conclusion and unfairly prejudicing the defendant.3 8
In 1992, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down a
decision in Zal v. Steppe, in which they ruled that in limine word
bans on attorneys were not violations of free speech.39 In Zal, the
court examined a contempt sanction against a defense attorney for
violating the word ban. 40 The court upheld the word ban and
found that no constitutional violation took place. 41 The defendants
in that case were abortion protesters who were on trial for
criminal trespass. 42 The Ninth Circuit in Zal upheld the word
bans without providing guidance to lower court judges; this
effectively gave district judges unlimited discretion to censor
attorneys. 43 The holding in the Zal case was directed at prior
restraint of free speech for attorneys.
In United States v. Rosenberg,44 the government filed a
motion in limine to preclude the use of thirty-six different words at
trial. 45 The defense characterized the government's motion as a
held, "Her use of the term 'rape' was clearly a convenient shorthand term,
amply defined by the balance of her testimony." Id.
36. State v. Vinson, 215 S.E.2d 60, 70 (N.C. 1975) (holding that the victim's
use of the word 'rape' during her testimony did not constitute an opinion on a
question of law and that the trial court did not err in admitting the testimony).
37. See State v. Sneedon, 164 S.E.2d 190, 193 (N.C. 1968). The Court went
on to say that "it is inconceivable that the jury could have construed it
otherwise, and its admission was not error." Id.
38. Goss, 235 S.E.2d at 850; Sneedon, 164 S.E.2d at 193; Vinson, 215 S.E.2d
at 70; see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-11.1 (West 2008) (stating that in
Illinois, the word "rape" when used by a witness, prosecutor, or defense
attorney is admissible).
39. Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 927-28 (9th Cir. 1992).
40. Id. at 925.
41. Id. at 929.
42. Id. at 925.
43. Kathleen K. McGinn, Zal v. Steppe: Ninth Circuit Approval of an In
Limine Word Ban of Specific Words 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 35, 36 (1993).
44. 806 F.2d 1169 (3d Cir. 1986).
45. See Douglas L. Colbert, The Motion In Limine in Politically Sensitive
Cases: Silencing the Defendant at Trial, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1307-09 (1987)
(discussing the way in which the government in United States v. Rosenberg
filed "its most far-reaching motion in limine" to exclude the use of certain
inflammatory words by defendants while testifying). Id. The government cited
Federal Rule of Evidence 402 in support of their motion, which states,
"Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." FED. R. EVID. 402.
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'gag order,' 46 but that motion was eventually denied.47 Both Zal
and Rosenberg were cases that involved highly charged political
issues.48

C. The Accuser Becomes the Accused
In banning the word "rape," Judge Cheuvront brought the
word ban issue, itself a complicated issue, into the complex
territory of balancing the rights of rape victims against the rights
of defendants.4 9 On the one hand, a defendant is entitled to a fair
trial5 0 and to confront the witnesses against him.5 1 On the other
hand, rape victims experience an extreme amount of trauma
testifying in court, 52 and the law has recognized their entitlement
to protection.53
The legal system has had difficulty in the past dealing with
rape cases because of the immense impact that stereotypes and
myths about rape have on their prosecution. 54 First of all, people
generally think of rape as an attack by a stranger in a dark alley

46. Colbert, supra note 45, at 1309.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 1307-09 (stating that the defendants in Rosenberg were part
of a black liberation group and were being charged with criminal trespass);
McGinn, supra note 43, at 35 (stating that the defendants in Zal were abortion
protesters being charged with criminal trespass).
49. See Aya Gruber, Pink Elephants in the Rape Trial: The Problem of TortType Defenses in the Criminal Law of Rape, 4 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
203, 206 (1997) (explaining that "[t]his struggle between women's rights and
defendant's rights has been highlighted in the ongoing debate over rape
legislation.").
50. See Turner v. State, 379 U.S. 466, 471-72 (1965) ("The right to jury trial
guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial,
'indifferent' jurors. The failure to accord an accused a fair hearing violates
even the minimal standards of due process.").
51. The Sixth Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
where in the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
52. See Megan Reidy, The Impact of Media Coverage on Rape Shield Laws
in High-Profile Cases: Is the Victim Receiving a "FairTrial"?, 54 CATH. U. L
REV. 297, 308-09 (2004) (discussing the way in which cross-examination can
feel like a "second rape" for rape victims).
53. See id. at 298 (explaining that rape shield laws were the state and
federal legislatures' response to rape victims' fear of not receiving a fair trial).
54. See KONRADI, supra note 9, at 5 ("Cultural stereotypes about rape
victimization and rape victims shape how rape survivors enact the victimwitness role, all the way through the process.").
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using force or aggression.5 5 This is, in fact, one of the least
common forms of sexual assault.5 6 However, these cases often
have more success in getting to trial and obtaining a conviction.57
In the nineteenth century, women were not seen as having a
distinct legal identity from their husbands or fathers.5 8 Rape was
not seen as crime perpetrated by a man who had legal ownership
over his wife and daughters.5 9 Despite the fact that women's
status has changed dramatically since that time, many of the
underlying stereotypes about women have persisted.6 0 It was only
well into the twentieth century that marital rape was even
acknowledged as a crime.6 1 In 1984, a New York judge struck
down the state's marital exemption. 62 Many other states took a
long time to follow suit.63 In 1997, some states continued to keep
55. See Daphne Edwards, Acquaintance Rape & the "Force"Element: When
"No"Is Not Enough, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 241, 271 (1996) (stating that
courts often would require a "force" element, which is consistent with the myth
that rapes are often committed by "violent strangers").
56. MATOESIAN, supra note 6, at 7 (explaining that "rape is not, for the
most part, committed by strangers ..... and stating that 84% of victims knew
their assailant); the incidence of rapes committed by strangers on the street is
a small percentage. Id. at 16. Patriarchal myths inhibit reporting of sexual
assault by blaming the victim and limiting reception of rapes to only 'real'
rapes, which are based on cultural stereotypes of strangers jumping out from
behind the bushes and attacking the victim. Id. at 13.
57. Matoesian writes:
The legal system is more likely to prosecute and juries are more likely to
convict in rape cases with the following characteristics: when the
perpetrator and the victim are strangers, and some type of extrinsic
force is used; when consent and intimacy, and prior sexual history are
not introduced as issues in the case; and when the victim is a 'nice girl'
or a virgin, and has not been drinking, using drugs, 'partying,' or
otherwise violating traditional female gender role behavior.
Id. at 15; see CASSIA SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A
GRASSROOTS REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT 19 (Springer 1992) (arguing that
"[r]ape cases involving strangers are taken more seriously than rapes
involving acquaintances.").
58. See Ingram, supra note 5, at 23 (describing how a woman's legal entity
united with her husband's at marriage).
59. See id. (explaining that the historical reasoning behind the marital
exemption was that women were property of their husbands and subject to his
control); Reidy, supra note 52, at 305 (noting that rape used to be considered a
property offense committed not against the woman herself, but rather her
father or husband).
60. See Reidy, supra note 52, at 306 (claiming that despite modern shifts in
thought about rape, much of the burden is still placed on the actions of women
as opposed to the crime itself, which takes away focus from the alleged
criminal act of the defendant).
61. See KONRADI, supra note 9, at 9 (explaining that "[w]omen who were
married had no prospect of securing legal action against husbands who raped
them, no matter how brutally.").
62. Gruber, supra note 49, at 216.
63. See id. (citing to the Model Penal Code that specifically rejected the
marital exemption). The removal of the marital exemption was a progression
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marital exemptions on the books, prescribing lesser penalties for
husbands who sexually assault their wives. 64
Rape trials have often been plagued with victim blaming that
made justice for the victim, in many cases, nearly impossible.65 In
1989, a Florida jury acquitted a defendant for abducting a woman
at knifepoint and repeatedly raping her based on the fact that she
was wearing a lace miniskirt without underwear.6 6 There have
been other similar cases,6 7 which show that the practice of victim
blaming is still commonplace in our legal system.68 The view that
rape victims have somehow contributed to their victimization is
unique to the crime of rape69 and is symptomatic of a larger bias
over time. Id.
64. As of 1997, several states such as Alabama, Illinois, and South Dakota
still incorporated some form of marital exemption into their rape statutes. Id.
65. See Edwards, supra note 55, at 271 (arguing that the purpose behind
the modern rape law reform was to shift the scrutiny away from victim's
behavior).
66. Gruber, supra note 49, at 219. The jury foreman said they acquitted
the defendant because they felt like the victim asked for it based on the way
she was dressed. Id.
67. See id. at 220-21 (describing one case in which a jury acquitted three
men despite kidnapping a woman and brutally raping her because during trial
the jury learned she was unmarried, had two illegitimate children, and was
possibly a prostitute, making her somehow responsible for her own rape); see
also Leslie Griffy & Mary Anne Ostrom, State Backs DA in De Anza Case,
Attorney General Finds Evidence Insufficient, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, May
3, 2008, availableat 2008 WLNR 8442140 (describing a case in which a young

college student was brutally raped and the District Attorney refused to
prosecute the case despite the fact that there were witnesses to the attack
because the girl was intoxicated at the time and could not remember the
attack).
68. See Ingram, supra note 5, at 7 (arguing that the history of bias against
rape victims has caused the legal system to scrutinize the victim's behavior,
looking for fault on her part).
69. See id. (arguing that society's attitude towards rape victims is "in sharp
contrast" to the attitudes of victims of other crimes); see also ANDREW E.
TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM 153 (New York
University Press 1999) (providing an example of a robbery cross-examination
employing the same tactics used against rape victims). Taslitz writes:
[Q:] Mr. Smith you were held up at gunpoint at the corner of First and
Main?
[A:] Yes.
[Q:] Did you struggle?
[A:] No.

[Q:] Why not?
[A:] He was armed.
[Q:] Then you made a conscious decision to comply with his demands
rather than resist?
[A:] Yes.
[Q:] Did you scream? Cry out?
[A:] No, I was afraid.
[Q:] I see, have you ever given money away?
[A:] Yes, of course.

224

The John Marshall Law Review

[43:215

against rape victims that are based on various gender
stereotypes. 70
These stereotypes date as far back as seventeenth century
England.7 ' English jurist Sir Matthew Hale has said that "rape is
an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proven and harder
to be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent." 72 This
infamous quotation is an excellent example of our society's distrust
of rape victims. It also demonstrates how, historically, rape
victims have been held to different standards than victims of other
crimes.7 3
Rape shield statutes have been enacted in many states to
protect rape victims' sexual history from being used against them;
however, they are not always effective. The Illinois Appellate
Court for the Second District has held that the rape shield
statute 74 was "not designed to preclude the admission of all
[Q:] And you did so willingly?
[A:] What are you getting at?
[Q:] Well, let's put it like this, Mr. Smith. You've given money away in
the past. In fact, you've got quite a reputation for philanthropy. How
can we be sure that you weren't contriving to have your money taken
from you by force?
Id. at 153 (emphasis in original).
70. See KONRADI, supra note 9, at 12 (claiming that rape stereotypes are a
unique form of gender stereotypes that stem from the belief that (1) rape
occurs because women give in to men's natural desires and/or fail to protect
themselves and (2) rape is unwanted sex and not violence).
71. Id. at 8.
72. See id. (explaining that Hale's caution is corroborated by three
stereotypes about women: (1) they are vindictive, deceitful and use rape
accusations as a tool to gain power over men; (2) they ask to be raped by the
way they dress which is a manifestation of their subconscious desire to have
sex with their attackers; and (3) they enjoy being forced to have sex).
73. See id. at 7 ("Historically, laws hampered the prosecution of rape by
delineating a narrow band of behaviors as criminal holding victims/survivors
of rape to different and higher standards of conduct than victims of other
crimes.").
74. The Illinois Rape Shield statute states:
In prosecutions for predatory criminal sexual assault of a child,
aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, aggravated
criminal sexual abuse, criminal sexual abuse, or criminal transmission
of HIV; and in prosecutions for battery and aggravated battery, when
the commission of the offense involves sexual penetration or sexual
conduct as defined in Section 12-12 of the Criminal Code of 1961; and
with the trial or retrial of the offenses formerly known as rape, deviate
sexual assault, indecent liberties with a child, and aggravated indecent
liberties with a child, the prior sexual activity or the reputation of the
alleged victim or corroborating witness under Section 115-7.3 of this
Code is inadmissible except (1) as evidence concerning the past sexual
conduct of the alleged victim or corroboratingwitness under Section 1157.3 of this Code with the accused when this evidence is offered by the
accused upon the issue of whether the alleged victim or corroborating
witness under Section 115-7.3 of this Code consented to the sexual

2009]

The Legal Implicationsof Word Bans in Rape Trials

225

evidence relating to sex."75 Attorneys have used these loopholes to
underhandedly attack witness credibility, and, for the most part,
judges have allowed it.76
III. ANALYSIS
A.
1.

Victims'and Defendants'Rights

Words and Prejudice

Word bans are a relatively new development in criminal
trials, which have been implemented to protect the defendant from
unfair prejudice.
There is considerable difference, however,
between the usual exclusion of prejudicial "subject matter" and the
exclusion of specific words used to describe perfectly permissible
subject matter. There have been occasions in which courts have
conduct with respect to which the offense is alleged; or (2) when
constitutionally requiredto be admitted.
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-7(a) (West 2008) (emphasis added). The statute
implies that prior consent to sexual conduct with the defendant is relevant to
whether or not the victim consented in the instant case. Federal Rule of
Evidence 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401. A victim's prior consent to sex with the
defendant, on a different occasion, does not prove that his or her complaint is
untrue. If this were the case, then an individual who is married or in a
committed relationship and is a victim of intimate partner violence would be
in danger of having the entire sexual history of the relationship brought out in
court and used against him or her.
75. People v. Grano, 676 N.E.2d 248, 257 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997). The trial
court held that the portion of the Illinois Rape Shield Statute that made
inadmissible evidence of "sexual activity or reputation" applied to prior
accusations of sexual assault. Id. at 288. The appellate court found that the
defendant could introduce evidence that the 14-year-old victim had made prior
accusations of sexual assault, despite the fact that there was no proof that the
allegations were false, merely that they were never successfully prosecuted.
Id. This also feeds into the stereotype that "if a woman says 'yes' there is no
reason to believe her 'no' the second time . . . ." Torrey, supra note 5, at 1014.
76. See Commonwealth v. Harris, 825 N.E.2d 58, 64 (Mass. 2005) (arguing
that a defendant may introduce evidence as to victim's bias or motive to lie
and evidence of victim's prior sexual conduct with the defendant). A judge is
granted broad discretion to decide if the prejudicial effect of the evidence
outweighs the probative value, and the judge is charged with exercising this
discretion wisely, keeping in mind the reasoning behind rape shield statutes.
Id.; see Torrey, supra note 5, at 1014 (arguing that despite reforms for rape
prosecutions, there are still various obstacles to a successful rape prosecution);
see Anderson, supra note 13, at 94 ("Since their passage, federal and state rape
shield laws have repeatedly failed to deflect the strictures of the chastity
requirement in real cases."); ESTRICH, supra note 1, at 88 (stating that in
Michigan, after rape shield laws were passed, defense attorneys admitted to
still delving into a victim's prior sexual history to discredit his or her
testimony).
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balanced the admissibility of certain words with the possible
prejudice against the defendant.
In State v. Cortes,7 7 the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed
an assault conviction because probative evidence was improperly
excluded.78 It also analyzed the possible prejudice of overuse of
the word "victim."79 It concluded that the use of the word over
seventy-six times did unfairly prejudice the defendant.8 0 The
court's reasoning was that the use of the word "victim" implied
that a crime had taken place and deprived the defendant of the
right to an impartial trial.8 ' Even in that case, the court's holding
turned on the fact that the trial court refused to provide a curative
instruction to the jury. 82
In Nebraska, where Ms. Bowen was raped, a word like
"victim" was not always viewed as prejudicial.83 In 1998, the
Court of Appeals of Nebraska ruled in a sexual assault case that
use of the word "victim" in a jury instruction was permissible
because it defined the victim as someone alleging to have been
sexually assaulted. 84 The court found that this clarification
prevented any unfair prejudice.85 There have been few, if any,
cases of prior restraint of a witness's testimony.86
77. 851 A.2d 1230 (Conn. 2004).
78. Id. at 1239.
79. Id. at 1240.
80. Timothy H. Everett, Developments in Connecticut Criminal Law: 2005,
80 CONN. B.J. 185, 205 (2006).
81. The court in Cortes stated:
In cases in which the fact that a crime has been committed is contested,
and where the court's use of the term "victim" has been the subject of an
objection and has not been the subject of a subsequent curative
instruction, a court's use of the term may constitute reversible error.
The danger in the latter type of case is that the court, having used the
term without specifically instructing the jury as to its intention in using
the term, might convey to the jury, to whatever slight degree, its belief
that a crime has been committed against the complainant.
Cortes, 851 A.2d at 1241.
82. Id.
83. See generally State v. Malcom, 583 N.W.2d 45, 50 (Neb. 1998) (noting
that use of the word "victim" was not prejudicial to the defendant).
84. The Court of Appeals of Nebraska said:
The instructions which Malcom complains of on appeal are phrased
essentially in the language of §§ 28-318 and 28-319. In addition, the
definition of "victim" as provided in instruction No. 3 clearly indicates to
the jury that "victim" is a person alleging to have been sexually
assaulted. Finally, the remainder of instruction No. 3 makes it clear to
the jury that the State must prove every element, including that
penetration occurred, beyond a reasonable doubt. We do not find any
error in these instructions, and this assigned error is without merit.
Id. at 50.
85. Id.
86. See Lithwick, supra note 22, at 2 (citing Wendy Murphy, New England
School of Law Professor and Bowen's attorney, in saying that word bans have
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2. Juriesand Witnesses
In jury trials, a witnesses' credibility is of the utmost
importance. Appellate courts routinely refuse to reverse a jury's
findings of fact because it has the firsthand knowledge of a
witness's testimony and can observe their demeanor on the
witness stand.8 7 Juries can determine if a witness is being
forthright not only by the answers they give, but in the manner
When a witness is forced to
that the answers are given.
contemplate every answer before it is given for fear of being in
contempt, it undoubtedly affects her credibility.
Words and language in general are crucial in jury trials. A
jury's perception of witnesses affects how they eventually render
their verdict, and language affects how juries view witnesses.
Language is the foundation of storytelling not only in life, but also
in the courtroom.88 This concept is exemplified by the dynamic of
the rape trial.
Perhaps, more so than any other crime, the crime of rape
heavily depends on the narrative that takes place in the
Often, sexual assaults are committed by
courtroom.89
acquaintances where the main issue is the victim's consentmaking the victim's credibility crucial; however, testifying in court
can be an intense and emotional experience for rape victims.9 0
The words that a victim uses can impact the way in which the law
addresses her experience.9 1 In State v. Rusk, a Maryland Court of
been a growing trend nationally since the Kobe Bryant trial and that there
has been a shift from limiting attorney speech to witness speech as well).
Prior to the start of trial, Bryant's attorney successfully won a motion to
preclude the use of the word "victim" during the trial. Kirk Johnson, Judge
Rules Bryant Accuser May Not Be Called 'Victim,' N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2004,
availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/02/us/judge-rules-bryant-accuser
-may-not-be-called-victim.html.
87. See, e.g., Dixie Serv., L.L.C. v. R & B Falcon Drilling USA, Inc., 955
So.2d 214, 220 (La. Ct. App. 2007) ("When there is evidence before the trier of
fact which, upon its reasonable evaluation of credibility, furnishes a
reasonable factual basis for the trial court's finding, on review the appellate
court should not disturb this factual finding in the absence of manifest
error.").
88. See TASLITZ, supra note 69, at 63 (describing the way in which
storytelling at trials "limits and shapes" our perceptions of what took place
and how storytelling is influenced by the way in which we use language).
89. See MATOESIAN, supra note 6, at 19 (discussing how language in the
courtroom documents the manner in which rape is legitimized as a social
norm). "If rape is routinely and systematically transformed into consensual
sex, then courtroom talk represents an excellent site for examining how the
victim's experience of violence (nonconsent) is delegitimized and
decriminalized in real live performance." Id.
90. See KONRADI, supra note 9, at 99 (stating that three-fourths of rape
victims surveyed said that testifying in court was an "intensely emotional
experience.").
91. See generally State v. Rusk, 424 A.2d 720 (1981) (discussing the effects
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Appeals case, the court's determination of whether there was
sufficient evidence at trial to sustain a conviction for seconddegree rape turned on the court's interpretation of the witnesses
description of being "lightly choked." 92 The Court of Appeals of
Maryland upheld the defendant's conviction on the grounds that
the Court of Special Appeals had substituted the jury's finding of
fact for its own.93 In that case, a witness's description of the
attack could have made the difference between a conviction and an
acquittal.
B. The Relevance of "Rape"

Banning the use of the word "rape" has been viewed as a
strange legal decision for various reasons. First of all, a jury is
unlikely to be influenced by the use of words like "rape" or "sexual
assault." 94 If this were true, there would be an extremely high
incidence of rape convictions, but in fact, the exact opposite is
true.95 Furthermore, the word ban was not in response to any sort
of legal issue that needed a remedy. Despite dismissing Bowen's
case, the Federal Judge Richard Kopf said, "For the life of me, I do
not understand why a judge would tell an alleged rape victim that
she cannot say she was 'raped' when she testifies in a trial about
rape."9 6 Unfair prejudice is not the only rationale behind word
bans.
Another reason behind the word ban is that it prevents a
witness from testifying to an "ultimate conclusion." This may
seem a legitimate justification, but it ultimately fails as there were
no similar word bans in other criminal cases. There are no cases

of a victim's chosen words).
92. See id. at 728 (describing the facts from which a jury could reasonably
conclude that the victim did not resist because of threatening acts by the
defendant, among them a light choke). The dissenting opinion came to the
opposite conclusion after discussing those same facts. Id. at 734-35. The
dissent analyzed the victim's testimony noting that she testified
that she started to cry and [the defendant] "started lightly to choke" her,
whatever that means. Obviously, the choking was not of any persuasive
significance. During this "choking" she was able to talk. She said "If I do
what you want will you let me go?" It was at this point that the
defendant said yes. I find it incredible for the majority to conclude that
on these facts, without more, a woman was forced to commit oral sex
upon the defendant and then to engage in vaginal intercourse.
Id. at 734.
93. Id. at 727.
94. See KONRADI, supra note 9, at 61 ("Unfair prejudice against the
defendant is far less likely than would be true for nonsexual crimes precisely
because it is so difficult, given existing patriarchal themes, to convince jurors
of defendant bullying, yet so easy to convince them of victim seduction.").
95. See Reporting Rates, supra note 4 (citing statistic that when rape cases
are actually prosecuted, only 58% of them are successful).
96. Bowen v. Cheuvront, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1029 (D. Neb. 2007).
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in which a witness was told not to say "robbed," "mugged,"
"murdered," or "embezzled." Other cases involving word bans
usually involved politically charged issues. In cases like Zal and
Rosenberg, the words being banned arguably served no probative
purpose and were only going to be used to incite emotion in the
jury. Rape is one of the few crimes that is treated in this way. 97
One explanation for this "special" treatment is that American
culture perpetuates myths and stereotypes about gender and rape,
which infiltrate our legal system.9 8 These stereotypes impact the
way society thinks about the word "rape" and its various
meanings. There has been a long-standing effort to reform rape
laws to redefine the legal definition of force by recognizing not only
physical force, but coercive force as well.99 The reasoning behind
this is that rape is more often committed using coercive force, yet
many courts still require proof of physical force.100
Pervasive stereotypes have affected the way men and women
generally think about words like rape and force.10 1 At first glance,
this argument weighs in favor of banning the use of the word
"rape" altogether. However, the confusion surrounding the use of
these words can also work against the victim if she is not
permitted to speak freely. 102 In Bowen's case, for example, she
alleges that Safi raped her while she was passed out.103 Assuming
that the use of "rape" would prejudice the defendant, the same
argument could be made if the victim were only permitted to use
such as "sex" or "intercourse."1 04 Robert Weisberg, a Stanford law

97. Common sense would tell you that a similar word ban on words such as
robbed, burglarized, or murdered would not withstand judicial scrutiny. See
Banned Words, supra note 10 (citing statement by Bowen's attorney saying
the ruling was absurd because it was 'like saying to a robbery victim, 'you
can't say you were robbed, because that's a legal judgment. You can only say
you gave your stuff to the defendant."').
98. See TASLITZ, supra note 69, at 19 (defining "cultural rape narratives" as
the stories based on widely held beliefs about gender roles which affect the
way narratives are interpreted in the courtroom).
99. See Edwards, supra note 55, at 258 (explaining that laws that prohibit
rape without a showing of force conform with feminist reforms).
100. Id. at 269-70 (citing study that shows that assailants more often use
coercive force than physical force). "In keeping with the 'violent stranger' rape
myth, courts often require the assailant to use overt physical violence and the
victim to resist to establish rape." Id. at 271.
101. See TASLITZ, supra note 69, at 76 (noting that "[t]he words 'rape' and
'force' simply mean different things to men and women.").
102. See Banned Words, supra note 10 (citing Wendy Murphy, Bowen's
attorney in saying that word bans on witnesses affect their credibility with
juries).
103. Hammel, supra note 10 (stating that Bowen awoke to find Safi having
sex with her).
104. See Lithwick, supra note 22, at 1 (arguing that use of the word "sex" is
another legal conclusion, that the sex was consensual); see also MATOESIAN,
supra note 6, at 17 ("Rape and intercourse are not separated by any difference
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professor, argues that in cases where courts replace the word
"victim" with the less loaded "complainant" there is no possibility
of prejudice to defendants because the same message is being
conveyed. 0 5 He states that in the case of rape, there is no "valueneutral word" for unwanted sex. 106
Jurors expect accusations to be made at a trial. 0 7 They
expect the person who is alleging to be a victim of a crime to make
that allegation on the stand. A witness telling a jury that she was
raped would not be unfairly prejudicial because it would merely
tell the jury what they already know, that the victim believes that
they were raped.108
In a recent case, the Appellate Court of Connecticut held that
the reasoning in Cortes'09 did not always apply. In State v.
Rodriguez,110 the court held that limited use of the word "victim"
combined with a curative instruction and the defendant's
presumption of innocence prevents any impermissible prejudice.",
In that case, the judge was able to ensure that the trial ran
smoothly, that all parties were fairly treated, and that the jury
was properly instructed on the law.112 The holding of Rodriguez
shows that a judge can control a trial without infringing on either
party's rights."13
The same logic used in Rodriguez could also be used for the
between physical acts or amount of force involved but only legally by a
standard centered on man's definition of the encounter.").
105. See Lithwick, supra note 22, at 2.
106. Id. (citing Professor Weisberg in saying that the word "intercourse" is
insufficient to describe rape, that a "blanket ban" on the word is not the
answer, and that it is a judge's responsibility to keep the trial fair by gently
admonishing the witness if they get out of hand or merely instructing the
jury).
107. See Alana Bowman, A Matter of Justice: Overcoming Juror Bias in
Prosecutions of Batterers Through Expert Witness Testimony of the Common
Experiences of Battered Women, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 219, 242
(1992) (stating that juries expect victims to fit certain stereotypes, and victims
that deviate from the stereotypes are distrusted).
108. Furthermore, because the issue of consent is a crucial one, in the
absence of any force, in the form of physical aggression or use of a violent
weapon, a jury will need to find evidence of lack of consent elsewhere. If the
jury was merely to hear the defendant and the victim had sexual intercourse
without the use of the word "rape" to explain that the defendant never
obtained the victim's consent, they will be more inclined to find that the sex
was consensual.
109. Cortes, 851 A.2d at 1230.
110. 946 A.2d. 294 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008), cert. denied, 953 A.2d 650 (Conn.
2008).
111. Id. at 305-06. The court reasoned that when the trial court used the
word "victim" only five times, the presumption of innocence instruction
mitigated any negative effect that the word may have had. Id.
112. See id. at 303 (stating that a judge's role in a criminal trial is that of a
moderator).
113. Id.
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word "rape." 114 If merely hearing a witness use the word "rape"
makes a jury presume that a crime occurred, then clearly that jury
has not been properly instructed on the law. For example, in an
embezzlement case, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for a
complaining witness to describe their belief that the defendant
embezzled money from them without using that word or other
similar words with similar meanings. It remains to be seen why
rape garners special treatment in the eyes of the law, and why
complaining witnesses in rape cases are treated so harshly.1 15
C. Rape is Different
As discussed earlier, there is a longstanding history of
mistreatment of rape victims who come forth and testify against
their assailants.1 16 This issue has gained attention in recent years
because of the media's increased involvement in high profile rape
cases. The Kobe Bryant case is a prime example of this trend.117
The negative media attention that the victim received in that case
made it even less likely that sexual assault survivors would come
forward.1 18 After the state of Colorado dropped the case against
Bryant, the number of reported rapes dropped 10% from the
previous year. 119 The way rape victims are treated in the media
impacts the way they are treated in the courtroom, because jurors
take their personal experiences and perceptions with them when
they come into court to decide a case. 120
It is a commonly held belief that men are, all too often, the
114. The logic used in Rodriguez, that the judge may cure possible prejudice
by a curative instruction, may be used in the case of rape. A judge may
instruct the jury that the witness's use of the term is not meant to imply to a
legal certainty that she was raped and that the defendant is innocent until
proven guilty.
115. See Matthew R. Lyon, No Means No?: Withdrawal of Consent During
Intercourse and the ContinuingEvolution of the Definition of Rape, 95 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 277, 291 (2004) (stating that, as of the article's publication,
the common-law majority rule was that women could not withdraw consent for
sex after penetration took place).
116. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing the law's history
of mistreatment of rape victims); supra note 69 and accompanying text
(explaining the way in which rape victims are held to different standards than
victims of other violent crimes).
117. See Aaron J. Lopez, Expert: Victims' Path Rockier than Celebrities,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Mar. 15, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 4883689
(discussing the Kobe Bryant rape case).
118. See id. (quoting Dr. Janine D'Anniballe, executive director of the
organization Moving to End Sexual Assault, in saying that the negative
treatment of the complaining witness combined with eventual dismissal of the
case have deterred others from coming forward).
119. Id.
120. See HUBERT S. FIELD & LEIGH B. BIENEN, JURORS AND RAPE 119
(LexingtonBooks 1980) (explaining the way in which jurors' decisions are
influenced by their biases).
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victims of false accusations and that rape prosecutions are easily
won.121 The Duke Lacrosse case exemplifies the way in which
people misunderstand rape trials. The prosecuting attorney in
that case came under fire after he mishandled the Duke Lacrosse
players' prosecution by withholding exculpatory evidence, among
other things.122 Edmund Davis, a Texas criminal defense attorney,
believes that this case has finally "leveled the playing field."123 He
was quoted as saying that in the past, "[prosecutors] used to be
able to trot out any old mule and call it a racehorse."l 24 Regardless
of the mistakes made in the Duke case, it is hard to dispute the
difficulty of obtaining a conviction in a rape case.125 Nonetheless,
comments like the one made by Davis are common.
Rape's "different" treatment in the eyes of the law126 carries
over into the word ban issue. Pamir Safi's defense attorney
argued that the word itself is so highly inflammatory that its
121. See TASLITZ, supra note 69, at 38-39 (citing a 1991 study of university
students that found that a quarter of students surveyed believed that women
frequently cried rape, frequently provoked the attack, and could prevent rape
if they really wanted to). The study also found that a third of those surveyed
believed that women sometimes enjoy being raped and when they say "no"
they really mean "yes." Id. Taslitz argues that this number underestimates
how widely held these beliefs are because university students are more likely
to have progressive opinions about rape. Id.
122. Benjamin Niolet, Lacrosse Case Leaving Mark in Courts Nationwide,
THE NEWS & OBSERVER, May 27, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 9954835
(stating that Mike Nifong, the prosecuting attorney, denounced the defendants
to the media while building a case on contradictory evidence and withholding
exonerating DNA evidence). Ultimately, Nifong was disbarred. The N.C.
State Bar v. Michael B. Nifong, 06 DHC 35, at *16 (June 16, 2007), available
at http://www.ncbar.com/Nifong%20Findings.pdf.
123. Niolet, supra note 122.
124. See id. (quoting Davis in saying that in the past, rape prosecutions were
won on little or unreliable evidence).
125. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (arguing that society's
bias against rape victims has caused the legal system to scrutinize their
behavior more harshly); supra note 70 and accompanying text (discussing the
stereotypes about women that are the basis for stereotypes about rape); supra
note 72 and accompanying text (quoting Matthew Hale in discussing his
beliefs about women that may impugn rape victim's credibility); supra note 73
and accompanying text (discussing the way in which rape victims are held to
higher standards than victims of other crimes); supra note 94 and
accompanying text (discussing how it is less likely for there to be prejudice
against a defendant in the case of sex crimes because of people's biases against
rape victims).
126. See SPOHN & HORNEY, supra note 57, at 23-24 (explaining that feminist
and legal scholars criticized the treatment of rape cases because they demand
that the rape victim demonstrate a level of resistance that was not required by
other victims of violence). Common law previously held that rape should be
treated differently because of the likelihood that vindictive and mentally
disturbed women would make false allegations against a defendant. Id. at 24.
Despite the fact that these claims never had any empirical support, juries
were often given an instruction similar to Lord Hale's warning. Id.
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utterance in the courtroom is extremely prejudicial to the
defendant.127 But even if the word "rape" did incite emotion in a
jury, most jurors have preconceived notions about rape victims in
their minds before the trial even begins.128 Also, courts have
regularly held that rape shield laws, used to prevent bias against
the victims, do not violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment
confrontation right.129
Since rape victims have historically received negative
treatment in the legal system,130 measures should be taken to
counteract these biases. 3 1 It seems that the same logic used to

127. Meg Massey, Putting the Term Rape on Trial, TIME, July 23, 2007,
available at http://www.time.com/timelnation/article/0,8599,1646133,00.html
?cnn=yes (citing Mock, Safi's attorney, in saying that "rape seethes with
enough emotion to prejudice a jury and is itself a legal conclusion. Once that
word is uttered, Mock says, 'the skunk is in the jury box and it's hard to get
the smell out"').
128. See FIELD & BIENEN, supra note 120, at 119 (stating that the law as it
relates to rape is mostly concerned with the notion of consent). Jurors will
often
use broad definitions of consent to determine some degree of willingness
on the part of the woman to have had intercourse with the defendant.
When the jurors perceive that the woman has precipitated or
encouraged the assault by her appearance or behavior, they are likely to
apply the "assumption of risk" criterion. Under these conditions, the
jurors are likely to be lenient with the defendant.
Id.
129. See Shawn J. Wallach, Rape Shield Laws: Protecting the Victim at the
Expense of the Defendant's ConstitutionalRights, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
485, 497-98 (1997) (stating that courts have repeatedly upheld rape shield
statutes despite criticism that they deny defendants their right to crossexamine and confront the witness against them); State v. Cassidy, 489 A.2d
386, 389 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985) (discussing the policy concerns behind rape
shield laws). These policy concerns include:
[P]rotecting the victim's sexual privacy and shielding her from undue
harassment, encouraging reports of sexual assault, and enabling the
victim to testify in court with less fear of embarrassment. ... Other
policies promoted by the law include avoiding prejudice to the victim,
jury confusion and waste of time on collateral matters.
Id.
130. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (providing examples of
historical mistreatment of rape victims in rape cases).
131. See Wallach, supra note 129, at 485-86 (arguing that rape is different
than other crimes because of the historical treatment of rape victims and the
added element of the consent). Rape shield laws have been enacted in almost
all fifty states to protect rape victims from disclosing their sexual history at
trial. Id. at 486. The state of Nebraska, where Tory Bowen's cases was tried,
has even acknowledged this fact. The Nebraska Legislature said in enacting
their sexual assault statute:
It is the intent of the Legislature to enact laws dealing with sexual
assault and related criminal sexual offenses which will protect the
dignity of the victim at all stages of judicial process, which will insure
that the alleged offender in a criminal sexual offense case have
preserved the constitutionally guaranteed due process of law

234

The John MarshallLaw Review

[43:215

exclude evidence of a victim's sexual history 32 could be used to
permit use of the word "rape." Considering the overwhelming
hurdle rape victims face' 33 in successfully prosecuting their claims,
an argument that the word "rape" is unduly prejudicial holds no
weight. Although the word "rape" serves little probative value in
terms of proving an element of the crime, its absence can impact
the jury's perception of what took place between the victim and
defendant and make the witness seem evasive and untruthful.
Like all other motions in limine,134 the jury is never informed
about the motion. A juror is likely to question why, in a rape case,
no one ever talks about rape.
IV. PROPOSAL

Considering the overwhelming evidence to the contrary, it
procedures, and which will establish a system of investigation,
prosecution, punishment, and rehabilitation for the welfare and benefit
of the citizens of this state as such system is employed in the area of
criminal sexual offenses.
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-317 (2007) (emphasis added). Nebraska's rape shield
statute states:
Evidence of a victim's past sexual behavior shall not be admissible
unless such evidence is: (a) Evidence of past sexual behavior with
persons other than the defendant, offered by the defendant upon the
issue whether the defendant was or was not, with respect to the victim,
the source of any physical evidence, including but not limited to, semen,
injury, blood, saliva, and hair; or (b) evidence of past sexual behavior
with the defendant when such evidence is offered by the defendant on
the issue of whether the victim consented to the sexual behavior upon
which the sexual assault is alleged if it is first established to the court
that such activity shows such a relation to the conduct involved in the
case and tends to establish a pattern of conduct or behavior on the part
of the victim as to be relevant to the issue of consent.
Id. § 28-321(2).
132. The reasoning is that its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative
value.
133. See FIELD & BIENEN, supra note 120, at 47 (stating that because juries
are often comprised of ordinary people who buy into stereotypes about women
and rape, jurors may judge the victim based on these stereotypes influencing
the ultimate outcome of the trial). A victim's physical appearance can impact a
jury's decision because juries will either think that the defendant was
overcome with passion if the victim was attractive, or if she was not, that no
one would rape an unattractive woman. Id.; See also Robert Stansfield, Gang
Rape Girl Was Glad of Attention; Lawyer's Shock Claim to Court, THE
MIRROR, May 18, 2007, at 25, available at http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/topstories/2007/05/18/gang-rape-girl-was-glad-of-attention-1 15875-19122896/
(discussing a sexual assault case in the United Kingdom against three young
boys accused of gang raping a teenage girl where their attorney argued that
the girl must have consented to the sex to gain attention because she was
overweight and unattractive).
134. A motion in limine is defined as "a pretrial request that certain
inadmissible evidence not be referred to or offered at trial." BIACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1038 (8th ed. 2004).

2009]

The Legal Implications of Word Bans in Rape Trials

235

would be difficult to argue that defendants accused of rape face
extreme prejudice.135 This fact has led legislatures to enact rape
shield laws to prevent exacerbating a victim's trauma of testifying
against her accuser by protecting a victim from having to recount
her sexual history and having it used against her.136 Word bans
can have the same traumatic impact on victims as testifying about
their prior sexual history.137 These word bans serve no value in
the courtroom-they only serve to silence the witness and
undermine her credibility in front of the jury, 3 8 which is just
another example of how the system distrusts rape victims. To
allow a victim of theft or burglary to testify using those words, but
not afford the same rights to rape victims is a clear double
standard. The word rape is no more inflammatory than words like
"force" or "penetration," which are necessary to develop the
witness's testimony.
Despite the fact that rape is not a legal term in most states, it
can serve a function for victims while testifying. In Goss, the
victim used rape as a shorthand term when testifying to her
experience.139 A witness should be allowed to use whatever words
he or she pleases to describe their experience; issues of honesty
and credibility should be left to the jury. Jurors use biases when
they make their decisions, and any negative impact from word
bans, however minimal, can affect their verdict. 140
Rape shield laws have been enacted because lawmakers
acknowledge that criminal defendants' rights are not absolute and
that there are certain issues that serve no purpose but to waste

135. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text (discussing the legal
system's bias against rape victims); see also Torrey, supra note 5, at 1015
(discussing how myths about rape and rape victims, dispute being untrue,
impact the way judges and jurors perceive testimony in rape trials).
136. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of
rape shield laws and quoting the federal statute); see also Reidy, supra note
52, at 299-300 (discussing that introducing a rape victim's prior sexual history
at trial is like putting the victim herself on trial and because of this
heightened burden, that is not present in other criminal trials, rape victims
need additional protection).
137. See Clarence Mabin, Controversial Sex Assault Trial Starts Monday,
LINCOLN JOURNAL STAR, July 8, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 13055368
(citing PAVE founder Angela Rose stating that Judge Cheuvront's ruling was
related to the problem of re-victimizing sexual assault victims).
138. See Banned Words, supra note 10 (quoting Wendy Murphy, law
professor and Bowen's attorney, in saying that word bans impugn a witness's
candor and credibility).
139. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (quoting Goss where rape
victim was allowed to testify that she was 'raped' as a shorthand version for
saying that the defendant had sexual intercourse with her without her
consent).
140. See Torrey, supra note 5, at 1050 (explaining that jurors use their own
prejudices and biases when interpreting the facts of a case).
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the courts' time. 141 Primarily, rape shield statutes are there to
protect victims' rights and prevent a victim from being exposed to
further trauma on the witness stand.142 Protecting rape victims
from word bans also serves this same goal.
One of the main problems with rape shield statues, in their
current incarnation, is that they contain exceptions that allow for
relaxed enforcement to the detriment of rape victims.1 43 One of
the first tasks would be to clarify or remove these exceptions. The
existence of loopholes or exceptions in the current laws144 makes it
too easy for lawyers to get around the rules. These exceptions
need to be narrowly tailored to deal with the necessary
confrontation issues.1 45 If this revision is insufficient, then these
exceptions should be removed.
The sexual history that is
admissible under these provisions serves no probative purpose. It
merely offers one way in which a victim's sexual history can be
used against her.
Second, rape shield statutes must be amended to allow a
victim to testify freely about his or her experience. As has been
shown, the danger of prejudice against the defendant is minimal.
Also, courts have historically allowed victims to use their own
words to describe their own experiences, even if they are coming to
a conclusion about whether or not a crime has taken place.
The amended portion of the Federal Rules should include a
provision that specifically deals with word bans. 4 6 The text
should stress the importance of a rape victim's right to freely
141. See Gruber, supra note 49, at 225 (explaining how rape shield laws
were enacted in order to counteract "social problems" that impacted the level
of reporting, prosecution, and conviction).
142. See Torrey, supra note 5, at 1030 (explaining how testifying at trial can
evoke similar emotions in a victim as when she was raped, which often
discourages a victim from coming forward).
143. See Anderson, supra note 13, at 56 (discussing how the exception for
prior sexual conduct with the defendant is ineffective because "men with
whom the complainant has been previously intimate commit 26% of all
rapes"). Anderson cites, as one of the main reasons for why rape shield
statutes are generally insufficient, congressional floor debates that dealt more
with the emotional trauma of testifying and not with the "unfairness of
measuring rape complainants against a yardstick of sexual morality." Id.
144. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (discussing examples of
loopholes in rape shield laws).
145. For example, courts should only allow cross-examination into topics
that would typically be permissible in cross-examinations of victims of other
crimes. A rape victim's sexual history with the defendant is as irrelevant as
evidence that a victim of embezzlement had, at one time or another, lent
money to a defendant.
146. For instance, under this amendment, a rape victim should be permitted
to speak freely about his or her experience when testifying in front of jury.
Any limitations of witness testimony should be made with the utmost judicial
discretion and only in cases when it is absolutely necessary to preserve a fair
trial for defendant as well as the victim.
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testify without censorship, but there should be room for judges to
exercise discretion in cases of blatant prejudice. However, judicial
action should only be allowed in cases where the testimony is
highly prejudicial and/or has no probative value.14 7
One of the main problems with the word ban is that it is a
prior restraint on the speech of the witness. Prior restraint is
particularly problematic in a courtroom setting because a witness'
credibility can be affected if they are concerned with complying
with a word ban. This is why it would be more appropriate to
allow a witness to testify and then deal with objectionable
testimony later. In general, however, a rape victim's right to
testify should be given considerable weight.
These aforementioned rules must be followed in state courts
where the vast majority of rape cases are tried. The Federal Rules
are not binding in state courts; 148 however, many states have
adopted evidence codes that are similar or identical to the Federal
Rules. 149 The amended portion of the Federal Rules should
include a provision advising states to similarly amend their
evidence codes to reflect the changes in the Federal Rules.
This proposal would not unfairly infringe on defendants'
rights because it is in line with other provisions under the Federal
Rules that allow for the rights of victims or witnesses to be taken
into consideration. While a defendant is generally considered to
have a right to a fair trial,150 they do not have a constitutionally
protected right to a favorable trial.151 Allowing a rule of evidence
to acknowledge the inherent bias toward rape victims in the legal
system would merely be guaranteeing a fair trial for everyone. 152
Furthermore, as several cases have already outlined, a simple
curative instruction would be sufficient to indicate to the jury that
they are not to treat the use of the word "rape" as a legal

147. A limit on judicial discretion is necessary because judges are susceptible
to myths and stereotypes just like jurors. Torrey, supra note 5, at 1055.
148. "These rules govern proceedings in the courts of the United States and
before United States bankruptcy judges and United States magistrate judges,
to the extent and with the exceptions stated in rule 1101." FED. R. EVID. 101.
149. See Julie A. Seaman, Triangulating Testimonial Hearsay: The
ConstitutionalBoundaries of Expert Opinion Testimony, 96 GEO. L.J. 827, 836
(2008) (stating that the Federal Rules of Evidence were "enacted in 1975 and
thereafter adopted in whole or in substantial part by the vast majority of the
states").
150. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (describing defendants'
rights in criminal trials).
151. See Gruber, supra note 49, at 211 (arguing that "[i]t is beyond dispute
that a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to present irrelevant,
prejudicial evidence in his or her behalf.").
152. See Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887) (emphasizing that the
right to an impartial trial involves not only eliminating bias against the
defendant but also any bias against the prosecution).
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There is no other parallel in criminal law to the crime of
sexual assault. 15 4 All too often, the case comes down to the
victim's testimony against the defendant's testimony. This makes
credibility crucial in determining which side prevails. Rape
victims, women in particular, face enormous obstacles when trying
to convince juries of their credibility.
At the start of the trial the deck is stacked against them
because of years of gender stereotyping that has led to pervasive
myths about rape, 5 5 and when juries decide cases, they take these
myths and stereotypes with them when they deliberate.156 The
law must recognize this fact and take steps to counteract these
biases in order to balance the playing field so that both parties can
be assured a fair trial. 57 While the victim has no constitutionally
protected right to a fair trial, a fair and balanced trial is in the
interest of justice and all parties involved.155
CONCLUSION

Word bans in rape trials will have a detrimental effect on the
progress that has been made in sexual assault reporting and
153. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (citing the Malcom case's
allowance of the word rape so long as a curative instruction was given to the
jury).
154. See Gruber, supra note 49, at 205 (discussing how rape is one of the
most brutal forms of criminal victimization and often leaves the victim
suffering intense and prolonged trauma).
155. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing the various
stereotypes about women that impact people's perceptions about rape).
156. See Gruber, supra note 49, at 219 (discussing how judges and juries rely
on tort-like defense like assumption of risk when placing blame on rape
victims for their attack). Gruber goes on to say that this reliance impacts
many judicial decisions ranging from admissibility of evidence to jury
instructions. Id. See also State v. Overman, 153 S.E.2d 44, 58 (N.C. 1967)
(holding that "[c]ontributory negligence by the victim is no bar to prosecution
by the State for the crime of rape.").
157. Contra Jason Wool, The Presumption of Innocence in Date Rape Trials
Through the Use of Language Orders: State v. Safi and the Banning of the
Word 'Rape," 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 193, 224 ("The contrast between
the female desire to 'have my day in court' with the defendants' rights
advocates' desire to 'play by the rules' elucidates at least one possible
conclusion about today's legal system: It cannot work for both men and women
in the context of date rape trials." In his comment, Wool takes the position
that word bans are necessary to preserve the defendants' right to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty despite inherent bias against rape victims. Id. at
226. He does, however acknowledge that juries should, at the very least, be
made aware of the word ban. Id. at 225. Specifically, Wool writes it's "only
fair for the judge to instruct the jury that the order is in place, and that the
complainant will not be able to use legally conclusive terms." Id.
158. See Torrey, supra note 5, at 1058 (discussing that rape victims are
entitled to a fair trial because of the way in which they are put on trial,
essentially placing them in the position of the defendant).
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advocacy. Tory Bowen described how the word ban stifled her
testimony and made her feel like she was perjuring herself by not
speaking freely and truthfully. 59 Jurors, making findings of fact
and determining issues of credibility, can sense doubt in a witness.
Rape victims already fear coming forward and facing their
accusers. Censoring rape victims' testimony after they have
finally found enough courage to come forward would only
exacerbate that fear. The solution is to amend rape shield laws to
include a provision protecting victims from word bans in order to
preserve their right to testify truthfully. These changes are
necessary to ensure that rape victims are protected against this
unfair and unnecessary measure that only serves to further reduce
their credibility in the eyes of the jury. In many rape cases, where
the outcome of the trial comes down to the issue of consent, it is of
the utmost importance that rape victims not be silenced and that
they be allowed to give their testimony unhampered by
unreasonable court orders.

159. See Banned Words, supra note 10 (stating that "[iln Bowen's opinion,
Cheuvront's ruling means she will have to lie on the witness stand.").

